Amr Khaled: Political or Cultural Phenomenon?

FIRST WRITTEN IN FEBRUARY 2006
In response to a journalist who was preparing a long article on Amr Khaled for the New York Times Magazine, Samantha Shapiro, and contacted me to have an opinion on whether the Khaled phenomenon “should be framed as political or cultural”:

• Back in the ’70s, Islamism begins to exert a pull on people in most of the Arab and Muslim countries when they realize that nationalist, nasserist, or socialist governments are not willing to implement social justice, and are instrumentalizing Islam for their own benefit. The positive produce of modernization is controlled by ‘happy few’ while the rest of the society remains poor. That’s why Islamism attracts young uneducated people from rural origins, who are then crowding the cities but not finding any job; this new class is frustrated in its dreams of having a basic middle-class life with apartment, car, wife, etc. Political Islam channels the anger of these young people. Besides, small religious-conservative tradesmen are also engrossed by this ideology because they are constantly deterred by elite from growing economically.• So, in a typical Arab society, from the ’70s to the ’90s, youth has 2 choices:
1- To be pro-government (but without earning benefits of it if they are not from the upper class)
2- To embrace Islamism fighting against State authoritarianism and western imperialism to establish an Islamic State ruled by ‘Sharia’

• However, Islamism is not able to come to power (except in Iran and Sudan), and the militants are bloodily crushed by the military forces; a lot of the militants of the Muslim Brotherhood are imprisoned. Hence, young people as well as the businessmen who had supported the Islamic movement realize that to get a decent life, Islamism is not the solution. On the other hand, secularism appears to be also an unattractive ideology while official Islam is clearly lethargic. So where is hope in the Muslim world? Is it still possible to believe in something? Is there a “third way”?

• Today hope comes from Islamic preachers or modern Sufi communities (in Turkey) who have integrated modernity without rejecting Islamic values. These new leaders are charismatic, energetic, even wealthy. In their speech, they make compatible capitalism and Islam, which is very new: you can be wealthy, active, entrepreneur, and be a good Muslim. It is important to mention that Amr Khaled is not the only example of the phenomenon.The Turkish Sufi master Fethullah Gulen is very significant as well (see his website: http://en.fgulen.com/). Responding eagerly to his sermons in the ’70s, the members of his community created newspapers, radio and TV channels, hospitals, hundreds of privates schools around the world… As Amr Khaled, Gulen was forced to leave Turkey a few years ago because of the military pressure – and he now lives in Virginia. He has millions of followers in Turkey and the Turkic republics of Central Asia.In Indonesia, Abdullah Gymnastiar (called ‘Aa Gym’) is also a very popular preacher.So we have a new trend with a huge potential in the Muslim world. For me, the new Islamic preachers (Khaled, Gulen and Gymniastar) should be described as:
1- Morally conservative
2- Economically liberal (willing to influence consumption patterns; using media and new communications)
3- Politically disengaged, rather conservative, but aiming at good relationships with every government. Their “hidden” agenda – if one – is democracy, not Caliphate and Sharia.
4- Socially and culturally active/innovativeIn this sense, they really look like the American televangelists such as Billy Graham.

• In addition, maybe you could mention that the changes in global economy have had a great importance in this evolution; the revolution of transports, communications, the worldwide competition on very individualized products enhance cultural differences so Islamic identity become profitable. In Turkey, the marketing and advertisement of “Islamic products” were very successful in the ’90s. “New Islam”, the one Amr Khaled preaches, calls indirectly for entrepreneurial and consumerist behaviors, that is, more individualism and confidence, which lastly could facilitate transition to democracy; in spite of the current Chinese example, it would be very difficult to maintain a military dictatorship in those new conditions. Khaled’s problems with the Egyptian authorities in 2002 could come from their fear of that.That is what happened in Turkey with the November 2002 elections of a former Islamist close to the Gulen movement, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, quickly followed by the withdrawal of the military from political life. The 10-year-advanced Turkish path could inspire Egypt.Therefore, Amr Khaled can be considered as a social apolitical phenomenon although it can have political consequences because he is able to deeply transformed mentalities.

• In conclusion, I think that Moderate Islamic identity, as Amr Khaled’s or Fethullah Gulen’s, is the result of an evolution from aggressive resistance to the acceptance of the world as it is; but inside Muslim societies this acceptance must be softly tailored to remain in keeping with reassuring Islamic values. Socially Amr Khaled is doubly useful:
1- For the lower class, it can be a bridge between a frightening modernity and traditional values; he can “prepare” them to be an active part of the capitalist world.
2- For the middle and upper class, the return to religious values may set the mind at rest in a fast-changing environment.For youth, his ideas may represent a new hope of self-achievement and happiness.